WRULD Claims heard in England, Scotland and Wales

References to and/or interpretations of Health and Safety Regulations - Conaty - v - Barclays Bank plc

Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992
	Contextual Commentary | Conaty - v - Barclays Bank plc | Find Other Cases

In this County Court Judgment on the 6th April 2000, at B on page 2, HH Judge Rich states:

In his final speech [Counsel] for the Bank accepted that they had indeed been in breach of statutory duty. The statutory regulations which apply to the Claimant's work in the accounts section included the Health and Safety Display Screen Equipment Regulations 1992, which obliged the Bank to analyse the Claimant's work station for the purpose of assessing the health and safety risks to her, so to plan her activities so that her work at the screen was periodically interrupted by breaks and changes in activities and to train and advise her about health and safety. The Claimant worked at whatever desk was appropriate for the particular task she was undertaking, whether for example opening or closing accounts. There were adjustable chairs but she tells me, and I find, keyboards with limited scope for movement, which in any event she was not instructed to position suitably, and no foot rest. She is only five foot tall. She was not instructed either as to the correct posture for use of a keyboard or as to the importance of assuming a correct posture. She habitually therefore adopted what is agreed to be a bad posture whereby her wrist was flexed and whilst using the numeric keys subject to ulnar deviation instead of being kept straight, as is recommended. The keyboarding on which she was employed was largely on the numeric keys as opposed to the alphabetic keys, She used only her right hand and made no use of her thumb in keyboarding, which accordingly she stuck out to the side of her right hand. The absence of training and even appropriate posture were not seriously challenged in evidence, although denied in the pleadings. It is said that she had only to ask for a foot rest for it to be supplied, but even if that were a defence to the breach of the Regulations I am satisfied that that is not so as a matter of fact.

It should be noted that it was common ground that the Claimant had suffered right De Quervain's Syndrome but that she did not use her right thumb to enter data. HH Judge Rich goes on to say, at C on page 3:

The Claimant adopted an approach to her work which no doubt explains in part her exemplary speed of work. She prepared her work load so as, so far as possible, to perform all sorting and handwriting for a number of accounts together and then to concentrate on the keyboarding. This she thought more efficient than taking each account separately and interrupting keyboarding with other tasks, although it transgresses advice to interrupt the keyboarding with other activity. The Bank, I am satisfied, made no attempt to plan her work otherwise. I am therefore satisfied that the concession that the Bank was in breach of its statutory duty was rightly made.

The real issue in this case however is whether such breach caused the injury from which the Claimant undoubtedly suffers.

Both Medical Experts agreed that the Claimant's suffering from De Quervain's Syndrome at her age (22) without either a traumatic or a hormonal cause was a misfortune such as had not been identified in cases discussed in the literature or paralleled in the direct experience of either Medical Expert. After reviewing the medical and ergonomics evidence, HH Judge Rich states, at A on page 12:

[Counsel for the Claimant] relies on the fact that the regulations which the Defendant now admits to have breached are intended to protect the employee against upper limb disorders. He therefore invites me to conclude that the breach is probative of the causation. If he had reduced his submission to syllogistic form as follows: (1) the regulations are to protect against upper limb disorder; (2) this is an upper limb disorder; therefore, (3) the breach of the regulations caused the disorder, the logical fallacy would be obvious. He also relied, however, on the coincidence of time between the onset of the pain and the concentrated work which the Claimant says she undertook immediately before it.

After reviewing the factual evidence, HH Judge Rich states, at F on page 13:

In such circumstances I do conclude that the temporal relationship between the activity up to Friday, 11th November 1994 associated, as I find, with pain during the working day on Friday and acute pain that night does make it more probable than not that the disorder is work related. As such I have no difficulty in holding that it arises from the poor posture adopted by the Claimant which itself was caused by the Defendant's breaches of statutory duty, both in the layout of the work station and lack of training and concentration of keyboarding which I have identified.

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Last updated: 14/05/2013